Made-Up Minds addresses fundamental questions of learning and concept invention by means of an innovative computer program that is based on the cognitive ...

When Francis Bacon declared his intent to torment and interfere with nature, he probably did not envision sickly experimental hogs with human genes. But the Baconian desire to understand nature and place “her” at our command has entrenched itself in our collective psyche, and the bioengineering epoch has enabled us to impose our desires in ways Bacon could not have imagined. In so doing, have we stepped over the bounds of decency?

Most people care about animals, but only a tiny fraction are vegan. The rest often think of veganism as an extreme position. They certainly do not believe that they have a moral obligation to become vegan. Gary L. Francione—the leading and most provocative scholar of animal rights theory and law—demonstrates that veganism is a moral imperative and a matter of justice. He shows that there is a contradiction in thinking that animals matter morally if one is also not vegan, (...) and he explains why this belief should logically lead all who hold it to veganism. Francione dismantles the conventional wisdom that it is acceptable to use and kill animals as long as we do so “humanely.” He argues that if animals matter morally, they must have the right not to be used as property. That means that we cannot eat them, wear them, use them, or otherwise treat them as resources or commodities. Why Veganism Matters presents the case for the personhood of nonhuman animals and for veganism in a clear and accessible way that does not require any philosophical or legal background. This book offers a persuasive and powerful argument for all readers who care about animals but are not sure whether they have a moral obligation to be vegan. (shrink)

Einstein's General Theory of Relativity links the metrical structure of the cosmic order (or "cosmology") to the contingent distributions of matter and energy throughout the universe, one of the chief areas of investigation in astrophysics. However, presently we have neither devised nor discovered system of uniform relations whereby we can make our cosmological measurements intelligible. This is "the measurement problem of cosmology." Using both historical ideas (such as A.N. Whitehead's work in the 1920s) and contemporary evidence and theories, argue that (...) the measurement problem has neither been fully understood nor rightly interpreted. With better grasp of this problem, such as am attempting to provide, the prospects for solution look brighter. (shrink)

A more complete and balanced theoretical framework for social psychology, as recommended in the target article, must include functional explanations of processes – moving beyond enumerations of processes and their properties. These functional explanations are at a different, but complementary, level from process descriptions. The further advancement of social psychology relies on the incorporation of such multilevel explanations.

Encyclopedia entry for the British mathematician and American Philosopher Alfred North Whitehead. Usefully summarizes his life and work for non-specialists and, more especially, interested persons outside of the philosophical disciplines per se.

Our conventional wisdom about animal ethics, as embodied in the animal welfare position, is that animals are not things to whom we can have no moral obligations. Animals who are sentient, or subjectively aware, have a morally significant interest in not suffering. But, because they are not self-aware, they do not as an empirical matter have an interest in continuing to live. So we may use and kill animals as long as we do so ‘humanely’ and do not impose ‘unnecessary’ (...) suffering on them. There are at least two serious problems with our conventional wisdom in this regard. First, because animals are chattel property, we undervalue or ignore their interests in not suffering. Second, we cannot justify the view that animals who are sentient do not have a morally significant interest in continuing to live. If animals are not things and matter morally, our institutionalized exploitation of them cannot be justified, and veganism is a moral imperative. (shrink)

"An essential overview of an important intellectual movement, Logical Empiricism in North America offers the first significant, sustained, and multidisciplinary attempt to understand the intellectual, cultural, and political dimensions of ...

Gary L. Cesarz - Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.1 166-167 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Gary L. Cesarz Southeast Missouri State University Eric Watkins. Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xi + 451. Cloth, $75.00. Paper, $32.99. Eric Watkins' book is a substantial contribution to Kant scholarship, metaphysics, and the philosophy of science. (...) It could change the debate on the nature of causality, for it illuminates the advantages of Kant's critical conception of causality over the Humean theories favored today and outlines how Kant's analysis clarifies certain contemporary issues clustered around the notion of causality. Watkins' interpretation of Kant on.. (shrink)

Gary L. Cesarz - Spinoza's Book of Life: Freedom and Redemption in the Ethics - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3 361-362 Steven B. Smith. Spinoza's Book of Life: Freedom and Redemption in the Ethics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. Pp. xxvi + 230. Cloth, $35.00. Smith's well-crafted narrative contributes substantially to revealing the moral and political intentions "at the core" of the Ethics . Its focus is the role and (...) possibility of freedom in Spinoza's metaphysics, based on Smith's thesis that a version of teleological eudaemonism and democratic politics are the principal themes of the Ethics. Indeed, Smith considers the Ethics a "founding document of . . . democratic individualism" . He places Spinoza in his Enlightenment context, building on known.. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction The Inscrutability of Objectual Reference Empiricism, Naturalism, and Provincialism References.

Both the theoretical frameworks that organize the first part of Barbey & Sloman's (B&S's) target article and the empirical evidence marshaled in the second part are marked by distinctions that should not exist (i.e., false dichotomies), conflations where distinctions should be made, and selective omissions of empirical results that create illusions of theoretical and empirical favor.

Cybersecurity research often describes people as understanding internet security in terms of metaphorical mental models (e.g., disease risk, physical security risk, or criminal behavior risk). However, little research has directly evaluated if this is an accurate or productive framework. To assess this question, two experiments asked participants to respond to a statistical reasoning task framed in one of four different contexts (cybersecurity, plus the above alternative models). Each context was also presented using either percentages or natural frequencies, and these tasks (...) were followed by a behavioral likelihood rating. As in previous research, consistent use of natural frequencies promoted correct Bayesian reasoning. There was little indication, however, that any of the alternative mental models generated consistently better understanding or reasoning over the actual cybersecurity context. There was some evidence that different models had some effects on patterns of responses, including the behavioral likelihood ratings, but these effects were small, as compared to the effect of the numerical format manipulation. This points to a need to improve the content of actual internet security warnings, rather than working to change the models users have of warnings. (shrink)

In Good and Real, Gary Drescher examines a series of provocative paradoxes about consciousness, choice, ethics, quantum mechanics, and other topics, in an effort to reconcile a purely mechanical view of the universe with key aspects of our ...

I pulled weeds out of half-mile rows of soybeans on grandma and grandpa’s farm long before I heard of the controversy surrounding herbicide resistance and genetic engineering. Twenty years ago, Gordie, Richard, Greg, and I “walked beans,” not knowing that our fists and scythes were not the only means available to Grandpa for killing weeds. We knew little then about uprooting thistles with tractors and discs or about spraying chemicals onto mustard. We knew only that a cool thermos of lemonade (...) and some stem looks from Mom would motivate our troop into action because every good Iowan hated volunteer corn and sunflower shoots. The hatred stemmed as much from the fact that the weeds made a field “look messy from the highway” as from the fact that they cut down yields; Grandma had aesthetic sensibilities as highly developed as any character in Greg Brown’s song. (shrink)

When social issues involve questions as momentous as global survival, ethicists should do more than analyze arguments and formulate principles. They should help us find stories to put our values into practice. In the essays collected here, I have tried to tell my story in the hope that others might find it instructive.

Agricultural biotechnology refers to a diverse set of industrial techniques used to produce genetically modified foods. Genetically modified foods are foods manipulated at the molecular level to enhance their value to farmers and consumers. This book is a collection of essays on the ethical dimensions of ag biotech. The essays were written over a dozen years, beginning in 1988.

This book explores the effects of technology on the education of digital generations and the technology-mediated interaction that will prepare these generations for an unpredictable future. It discusses strategies and approaches for curriculum design, professional development, and other aspects of school organization involving technology.

Female waist-to-hip ratio (WHR) has generally been an important general predictor of ratings of physical attractiveness and related characteristics. Individual differences in ratings do exist, however, and may be related to differences in the reproductive tactics of the male raters such as pursuit of short-term or long-term relationships and adjustments based on perceptions of one’s own quality as a mate. Forty males, categorized according to sociosexual orientation and physical qualities (WHR, Body Mass Index, and self-rated desirability), rated female models on (...) both attractiveness and likelihood they would approach them. Sociosexually restricted males were less likely to approach females rated as most attractive (with 0.68–0.72 WHR), as compared with unrestricted males. Males with lower scores in terms of physical qualities gave ratings indicating more favorable evaluations of female models with lower WHR. The results indicate that attractiveness and willingness to approach are overlapping but distinguishable constructs, both of which are influenced by variations in characteristics of the raters. (shrink)

Discourse about the use of animals in biomedical research usually focuses on two issues. The first, which I will refer to as the “necessity issue,” is empirical and asks whether the use of nonhumans in experiments is required in order to gather statistically valid information that will contribute in a significant way to improving human health. The second, which I will refer to as the “justification issue,” is moral and asks whether the use of nonhumans in biomedical research, if necessary (...) as an empirical matter, can be defended as a matter of ethical theory.If it is not necessary as an empirical matter to use animals in research, then there is no need to inquire about moral justification. Therefore, I examine the necessity issue first. The argument that it is necessary to use nonhumans in biomedical research, though flawed, is at least plausible, unlike our necessity arguments for other animal uses. I then discuss the justification issue and conclude that we cannot morally justify using nonhuman animals in research. (shrink)

Three correctives can get researchers out of the trap of constructing unitary theories of “thinking”: (1) Strong inference methods largely avoid problems associated with universal prescriptive normativism; (2) theories must recognize that significant modularity of cognitive processes is antithetical to general accounts of thinking; and (3) consideration of the domain-specificity of rationality render many of the present article's issues moot.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Leibniz on Purely Extrinsic DenominationsGary L. CesarzDennis Plaisted. Leibniz on Purely Extrinsic Denominations. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2002. Pp. viii + 128 Cloth, $70.00.Interpreting Leibniz is like trying to flatten a balloon without deflating it; press it here and it bulges there. Press one of his controversial principles and problems result for another. Leibniz on contingent and necessary truths exemplifies this difficulty. So does Leibniz's denial that (...) there are "extrinsic denominations which have no foundationin the denominated thing" (NPE).Plaisted questions the meaning and challenges the current interpretations of this principle. Does "foundation" mean "included in a thing," or "reducible to an intrinsic denomination"? Furthermore, what is the thing denominated? Is it the individual concept of a substance, or an intrinsic denomination in the concept of the substance? Leibniz holds, "for all truths the predicate is contained in the subject" (PS) which, in some sense, includes both denominations (Leroy E. Loemker, ed., Gottfried Wilhelm Liebniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters [Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976], 268). This suggests that both denominations have the same status as predicates. However, such statements as, "there is no denomination so extrinsic that it does not have an intrinsic denomination as its basis" (Loemker, 527) and "all extrinsic denominations are founded in intrinsic denominations" (Benson Mates, The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language [New York: Oxford University Press, 1989], 225) suggest that the former reduce to the latter. The last two quotes seem to trump all hands. But textual citations are seldom enough to settle disputes of this sort.This has inspired two approaches to the question, one reductionistic, the other non-reductionistic. Plaisted adopts a non-reductionistic approach but regards those prior to his as implausible and unsatisfactory (1, 113 n.34). As for reductionism, he claims to "stand [End Page 494] [it] on its head" (1) and denies its "textual merit" (14). Given Plaisted's broad grasp of Leibniz's writings, this is not an oversight of the passages quoted above. Rather, his case depends on reinterpreting the same passages in light of his version of NPE.A reduction, according to some, requires that a relational proposition be logically equivalent (or at least truth-functionallyequivalent) to a set of non-relational propositions. For others, implication is sufficient, i.e., for a given relational proposition z, and two non-relational propositions x and y, it is impossible that (x & y) is true but z false (Mates, 218). In response, Plaisted examines NPE from four angles, including Leibniz's predicate-in-subject notion of truth, the identity of indiscernibles, and two others. However, since all that follows rides on his understanding of PS, let us focus on it.Plaisted's interprets NPE to mean "There are no extrinsic denominations of an individual... that are not included in that individual's concept" (11). To support this, he observes that Leibniz applies PS to all truths and often derives NPE from PS. But to justify substituting "included in" for Leibniz's use of "foundation in," Plaisted elects to interpret PS in a troubling way. Now, Leibniz insists that necessary truths state an identity between a subject and predicate, either explicit or implicit, and that the latter are reducible to the former by an a priori proof of finite length. Leibniz further says that identity, as explained above, is the reason that PS holds for necessary truths. Thus, Plaisted infers that "identity" and "having a reason" are equivalent, that this sense of PS generalizes to all truths (24-25), and claims support for his version of NPE. This is a positive result for Plaisted, for from it he infers that extrinsic denominations are included in the individual's concept as directly as intrinsic denominations, hence the latter cannot serve as the foundation for the former (25ff.). But this is problematic.First, it leads him to affirm that some denominations are both extrinsic and intrinsic (75). This is a strange conclusion to consider positive, for it implies that there are two types of intrinsic plus extrinsic denominations. Surely this strains the boundaries of "textual merit" at least as much as Plaisted charges against reductionists. More importantly, even if the equivalence Plaisted presses holds for necessary... (shrink)

Despite influencing the social sciences since the 1930s, S. S. Stevens' "operationist" philosophy of science has yet to be adequately understood. I reconstruct Stevens' operationism from his early work and assess the influence of various views (logical positivism, behaviorism and the "operational viewpoint" of P. W. Bridgman, among others) on Stevens. Stevens' operationism emerges, on my reconstruction, as a naturalistic methodological directive aimed at agreement, founded in turn on the belief that agreement is constitutive of science, the scientific community, and (...) objectivity. Further, I show that operationism is historically and philosophically independent of the views mentioned above. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.2 (2003) 297-299 [Access article in PDF] Pappas, George S. Berkeley's Thought. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000. Pp. xi + 261. Cloth, $39.95. Pappas' work is a judicious interpretation of three major themes in Berkeley's thought: his denial of abstract general ideas, theory of immediate perception, and appeal to common sense. Pappas modestly characterizes his aim to illuminate how these themes are connected (...) as one of many ways to approach Berkeley's philosophy. This book, though, is no modest accomplishment. Given the fundamental character of the first two themes and the skill with which he explores them, Pappas does more than connect three themes. He illuminates Berkeley's positions on matter, existence, essepercipi, and the Luce-Jessop thesis that Berkeley is a common sense realist (CSR). The book is broader in scope than its modest beginning suggests. It is a first-rate commentary, meticulous yet highly readable.Chapter I outlines Pappas' thesis and the hermeneutical distinctions he applies in his analysis and evaluation of Berkeley's arguments. He distinguishes two ways of evaluating theories: in light of the assumptions and standards operative when it originally appeared, and in light of those operative in our time. Judged either way, Pappas defends Berkeley's modern temper and continuing relevance, for his arguments fare better than commonly supposed.The next three chapters cover Berkeley's opposition to abstract ideas; Locke's [End Page 297] version mainly, but Malebranche, Leibniz and others are mentioned. Pappas convincingly argues that the denial of abstract ideas is fundamental to Berkeley's position on existence, perception and other central tenets of immaterialism. He opens by criticizing the thesis that Berkeley's rejection of the doctrine is "localized;" textually to the "Introduction" to the Principles, and philosophically to Berkeley's defense of nominalism and his views on language. This thesis, Pappas proves, is too narrow. He marshals textual evidence from the body of the Principles and other works to show the breadth of Berkeley's concern over the problems the doctrine engenders. He then examines the impact of the doctrine, if unchecked, on Berkeley's positive views.Pappas shows how such concepts as material substratum, primary and secondary qualities, existence as a predicate, and representationalism involve abstract ideas. This makes Berkeley's plan of attack plain: if abstract ideas can be undermined, the negation of the related concepts follows. The arguments required to accomplish this, however, are more sophisticated than many realize. To show this, Pappas distinguishes four types of abstract ideas. He then sorts out which of Berkeley's arguments go with which type of abstract idea, which arguments do and do not work, and how they might be repaired. Though Pappas admits that some modified versions of the concepts might survive Berkeley's criticisms, he holds that Berkeley's arguments are largely successful especially against Locke's versions of these doctrines.Pappas also ties Berkeley's denial of abstract ideas to his heterogeneity thesis (HT) defended in New Theory of Vision. This thesis maintains that what is perceived by one sense is numerically and specifically distinct from what is perceived by another; round as seen is distinct in both senses from round as touched. Berkeley considered HT an advance in perception theory andsaw abstract ideas as a threat. To admit an abstract idea of round would imply that there is an idea of the same kind common to sight and touch. Since this would undo HT, Berkeley had to combat abstract ideas. Berkeley's independent arguments against abstract ideas do not entail the truth of HT, Pappas holds, but they remove one source of evidence an opponent might use against it.New Theory of Vision also introduces Berkeley's concept of immediate perception. On the basis of this and the broader concept used in Berkeley's later works, Pappas establishes that "physical objects" (collections of sensible qualities) are the objects of immediate perception. This allows Pappas to make some sense of the claim that Berkeley can be read as a CSR. To do this, Pappas distills ten commitments of CSR and demonstrates... (shrink)

Agricultural biotechnology refers to a diverse set of industrial techniques used to produce genetically modified foods. Genetically modified (GM) foods are foods manipulated at the molecular level to enhance their value to farmers and consumers. This book is a collection of essays on the ethical dimensions of ag biotech. The essays were written over a dozen years, beginning in 1988. When I began to reflect on the subject, ag biotech was an exotic, untested, technology. Today, in the first year of (...) the millenium, the vast majority of consumers in the United States have taken a bite of the apple. Milk produced by cows injected with a GM protein called recombinant bovine growth hormone (bGH), is found, unlabelled, on grocery shelves throughout the US. In 1999, half of the soybeans and cotton harvested in the US were GM varieties. Billions of dollars of public and private monies are being invested annually in biotech research, and commercial sales now reach into the tens of billions of dollars each year. Whereas ag biotech once promised to change American agriculture, it now is in the process of doing so. (shrink)